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Abstract:  
 
Are public–private partnerships an appropriate means of dealing with underdeveloped 
cybersecurity-related institutions in India? Whereas the government lacks the resources and 
expertise to develop new templates, monitor industry behaviors, and enforce laws, trade 
associations are likely to have more experience and well-focused priorities in these areas. 
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Article:  
 
In July 2013, in response to domestic and international pressure to enhance cybersecurity 
measures, the government of India released the National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP; 
http://deity.gov.in/content/national-cyber-security-policy-2013-1), which set forth 14 objectives 
that included enhancing the protection of critical infrastructure and developing 500,000 skilled 
cybersecurity professionals in the next five years. A key component of NCSP is the development 
of public–private partnership (PPP) efforts to enhance the cybersecurity landscape. PPPs are 
especially well-suited for areas that require diverse types of expertise and knowledge to address 
complex problems, including cybersecurity.(1) 
 
In this article, I provide insight into various constraints the Indian government faces in 
strengthening cybersecurity and examine the private sector’s role in this area. 
 
 
 
 
Background 
 
India’s economy and the government’s limited resources have given rise to self-regulatory 
bodies in the private sector. 
 
Economic Issues 
 
Two key features of the Indian economy affect its cybersecurity posture. First, owing to the 
rapidly growing IT and business process management (IT&BPM) sector and its various data 
breaches, the country is facing unprecedented pressure from foreign offshoring clients and 
Western governments to strengthen cybersecurity. In 2011, the US and India signed a 
memorandum of understanding to promote cybersecurity-related cooperation and exchange 
information. In bilateral talks, the US emphasized India’s need for capacity building in 
cybersecurity, especially in cybercrime detection and investigation. Because India is a major 
offshoring destination for back offices and other high-value business functions, cybersecurity 
orientation of Indian businesses has been an issue of pressing concern to US and other Western 
businesses. 
 
Second, the Indian government severely lacks the resources to develop and enforce criminal 
cybersecurity-related regulations, standards, and guidelines. For instance, in 2011, the police 
cybercrime cell of Delhi had only two inspectors. In 2012, the Delhi High Court noted the Delhi 
police website’s lack of functionality, calling it “completely useless” and “obsolete.”(2) Until 
2010, there wasn’t a single cybercrime-related conviction in Bangalore, the country’s biggest 
offshoring hub. One law enforcement officer attributed the low conviction rates to the police’s 
lack of technical skills, knowledge, and training in collecting evidence.(3) For instance, when a 
police officer was asked to seize a hacker’s computer, he brought in the monitor. In another case, 
the police seized the CD-ROM drive from a hacker’s computer instead of the hard disk. 
 
Government Constraints 
 
Nascent and formative areas such as cybersecurity are often characterized by underdeveloped 
regulatory structures. There’s no template for policy development, assessment, and analysis. 
Developing templates, monitoring the behaviors of individuals and organizations, and enforcing 
regulations require extensive resources and expertise in such areas. However, most governments 
in developing countries are characterized by weak public administration, inadequate technical 
competence, and lack of political will in the implementation of economic and social policies.(4) 
 
Another factor is perhaps more important. The way the Indian government is positioned doesn’t 
allow it to spend state resources to support a new area at the cost of competing sectors. If 
policymakers allocate disproportionately more resources to develop modern sectors such as 
IT&BPM, they face stiff opposition from the mass of population that depends on the traditional 
economy. For instance, in India’s Andhra Pradesh state in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, 
political opponents attacked then–Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu’s decision to raise rice and 
electricity prices by cutting subsidies, which would worsen the welfare of most people. They also 
labeled his promotion of offshoring-related sectors and foreign capital as elitist. Naidu was voted 
out of office in 2004. For the majority of the Indian population, data privacy and security are 
largely irrelevant. 
 
Self-Regulatory Bodies 
 
Because of these factors, India’s IT&BPM sector manages cybersecurity risk through effective 
industry self-regulation. A highly visible private-sector actor is the National Association of 
Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM), established in 1988 as an industry-funded not-
for-profit organization to contribute to the software industry’s development. NASSCOM aims to 
help the IT&BPM sector to be a “trustworthy, respected, innovative and society friendly industry 
in the world” and to “[e]stablish India as a hub for innovation and professional services” 
(www.nasscom.in/vision-and-mission). 
 
Owing primarily to the uptick in data incidents, addressing data security and privacy issues has 
become increasingly important for the Indian IT&BPM sector’s success and vitality. In 2008, 
realizing the importance of an organization with an exclusive focus on data protection, 
NASSCOM established the Data Security Council of India (DSCI), a self-regulatory member 
organization. DSCI’s mission is to create trust in Indian companies as global outsourcing service 
providers. Its focus on cybersecurity is to “[h]arness data protection as a lever for economic 
development of India through global integration of practices and standards conforming to various 
legal regimes” (https://www.dsci.in/taxonomypage/1). DSCI took over most of NASSCOM’s 
data protection–related activities. 
 
NASSCOM and DSCI have been exemplary self-regulatory bodies, playing key roles in 
strengthening the IT&BPM sector’s cybersecurity orientation. They’ve played an equally 
important role in the PPP cybersecurity initiatives and worked with government and law 
enforcement agencies to formulate and enforce cybersecurity-related legislation. Table 1 shows 
major events associated with NASSCOM and DSCI’s evolution and their roles in enhancing 
cybersecurity. 
 
The Roles of NASSCOM and DSCI 
 
As of 2015, NASSCOM had more than 1,800 members, compared to 485 corporate members of 
DSCI. Although any company operating in India’s IT&BPM sector might have incentive to join 
NASSCOM, DSCI membership is especially important for companies for which cybersecurity is 
a key priority. NASSCOM membership fees vary from approximately US$450 to $100,000, 
depending on organization size. Many of NASSCOM’s members are also global firms from the 
US, Europe, Japan, China, and other countries. NASSCOM thus has a fairly high level of 
expertise and the financial resources to take various cybersecurity measures. 
 
DSCI monitors member companies to ensure they adhere to cybersecurity standards. For 
instance, it requires members to self-police and provide additional layers of security at the 
infrastructure, applications and other levels. The maximum fine for companies that fail to secure 
data is $1 million. Noncompliant companies might also lose their NASSCOM and DSCI 
memberships. 
 
Trade associations influence industry behaviors directly as well as through causal chains. 
Indirect effects entail mimicking behaviors of other actors that are perceived to be exemplary and 
have a higher degree of effectiveness.(5) Exemplary firms serve as models for smaller firms to 
imitate. In such cases, knowledge flow takes place by externalities mainly due to interactions 
among firms or their employees. Trade associations are likely to accelerate this process by 
stimulating interaction among member companies. 
 
A trade association’s enforcement strategy becomes efficient and powerful if a large number of 
firms join the association. NASSCOM ex-president Kiran Karnik addressed the importance of 
DSCI membership: “While it would be voluntary for the members to be part of the body, it 
would ensure at the same time that market forces make it mandatory for companies to register 
themselves.”(6) 
 
Table 1. NASSCOM and DSCI’s evolution and roles in enhancing India’s cybersecurity profile. 
Date Milestones and major events 
1988 
The National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) was 
established as a not-for-profit organization with 38 members, which accounted for 65 
percent of the software industry’s revenue. 
1990 NASSCOM began a public-awareness campaign to educate software users and encourage lawful use. 
Early 1990s NASSCOM teamed up with the Manufacturers Association for Information Technology to launch the Indian Federation against Software Theft. 
1994 NASSCOM and Business Software Alliance set up the toll-free Anti-Piracy Hotline in New Delhi. 
2003 NASSCOM started working with Mumbai police on cybercrime-related matters. 
2004 NASSCOM announced a plan to have its members’ security practices audited by international accounting firms. 
2004 NASSCOM started the Cyber Labs program with support from the government’s Department of Electronics and Information Technology. 
2005 NASSCOM announced a training initiative for Pune’s cybercrime unit. 
April 2005 Three former employees of Mphasis were arrested for allegedly stealing more than US$350,000 from Citibank customers. 
2006 NASSCOM drafted plans for new legal measures to safeguard intellectual property and prevent data theft. 
January 2006 The National Skill Registry (NSR) launched, allowing employers to perform background checks on existing or prospective employees. 
April 2007 The number of individuals registered in the NSR database reached 100,000, and the number of participating companies reached 36. 
2008 NASSCOM announced the establishment of the Data Security Council of India (DSCI) as a self-regulatory body. 
February 2008 The number of technology employees signed up for the NSR reached 220,000. 
2009 Cloud computing security was reviewed by the NASSCOM–DSCI Information Security Summit. It has been the focus of every annual summit since. 
2011 
DSCI announced a plan to set up a cloud security advisory group that would develop a 
policy framework. The group advises the government on security and privacy issues in a 
cloud environment. 
June 2011 In the DSCI Best Practices meeting, issues related to data protection in cloud computing and compliance were discussed. 
December 2012 A seminar organized by DSCI focused on preventing data theft and cyberattacks and securing critical infrastructure. 
March 2013 The DSCI had 654 organizations as corporate members, and more than 1,350 security and privacy professionals and practitioners as chapter members. 
August 2013 
The number of individuals registered in the NSR database reached 1.3 million, and the 
number of participating companies reached 118. It’s supported by 17 employee 
background-checking companies and 126 point-of-service vendors in various locations. 
December 2013 NASSCOM had more than 1,504 members, representing 95 percent of industry revenue. 
 
NASSCOM collaborates with other entities. For instance, in the 1990s, it teamed up with the 
Manufacturers Association for Information Technology to launch the Indian Federation against 
Software Theft. Similarly, it announced a plan to have its members’ security practices audited by 
international accounting firms. Industry leaders also advocated the adoption of certification 
under the British Standards Institution’s information security management systems, which covers 
network security, data sanctity, and data utilization terms.  
 
Partnerships between the government and the private sector are viewed as a promising way of 
generating new opportunities to leverage financial, human, and technological resources that 
aren’t likely to be available if the government attempts to do it alone.(7) This is especially 
pertinent for cybersecurity in developing economies owing to their resource-poor environments. 
 
The Need for PPP 
 
Prior research suggests that the public and private sectors’ different strengths, expertise, and 
experience could lead to complementary roles in meeting developmental and social needs.(8) A 
unique strength of the state government is its ability to impose harsh sanctions and penalties on 
violators of laws and regulations. Trade associations such as NASSCOM often have this level of 
technical expertise and resources and don’t face some of the constraints that limit the state’s 
ability to monitor and control cybercrime activities. 
 
Private and public sectors engaged in PPPs have different objectives, agendas, and interests. For 
example, one goal of the public sector is to employ private sector’s capital and technology and 
share risks with the latter to provide the delivery of public services or goods. By winning the 
public sector’s support, the private sector can increase profitability. 
 
The Indian government and the private-sector actors’ motivation and objectives partly overlap in 
strengthening cybersecurity. The IT&BPM sector plays a strategic role in the national economy, 
and most high-profile and widely publicized cybercrimes occur in this sector. In another case, 
call center workers at outsourcing services provider Mphasis transferred more than $350,000 
from four Citibank customers’ accounts to their personal accounts.(9) In major Indian cities, 
“data brokers” obtained data illegally from people working in offshoring companies. For 
instance, two people who claimed to be workers in Indian offshoring firms met Sunday Times 
undercover reporters with a laptop full of data and bragged that they had 45 different sets of 
personal information on approximately 500,000 UK consumers.(10) The information included 
credit card holders’ names, addresses, phone numbers, start and expiry dates, and security 
verification codes as well as information about mortgages, loans, insurance, phone contracts, and 
television subscriptions. NASSCOM initiated its crime-fighting efforts in response to these 
events in the Indian IT&BPM sector. 
 
Since the early 2000s, NASSCOM partnered with the Ministry of Information Technology to 
draft data protection and privacy laws in response to offshore clients’ privacy concerns. The goal 
was to bring Indian data protection laws to the same level as European and US standards. In 
2011, DSCI announced a plan to set up a cloud security advisory group that would develop a 
policy framework. The group would also advise the government on cloud security and privacy 
issues. 
 
PPP Achievements 
 
PPPs involve arrangements and cooperative relationships between public and private sectors, 
under which the latter undertakes actions that have been traditionally performed by the 
former.(11) NASSCOM has played a lead role in developing and implementing vital cybercrime- 
fighting programs that are normally initiated and led by the government agencies in the US and 
other industrialized countries. Consider the Cyber Labs program (www.dsci.in/cyber-labs), 
which is modeled after the National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance (NCFTA) in the US. 
Whereas NCFTA is a US federal government effort established by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, India’s Cyber Labs program is a private-sector initiative started by NASSCOM in 
2004 with support from the government’s Department of Electronics and Information 
Technology. Cyber Labs provide training and other support to police officers, prosecutors, bank 
officials, and others. As of April 2015, there were eight Cyber Labs in various Indian cities, 
which provided cybercrime training to more than 28,000 police officers. The Bangalore Cyber 
Lab alone has resources to train more than 1,000 law enforcement personnel annually. To 
educate legal communities, NASSCOM and DSCI also meet with bar councils in different cities. 
 
DSCI presents public- and private-sector employees and organizations with special awards and 
recognitions. For instance, the DSCI Excellence Awards began in 2011 in two areas: corporate 
(based on the preparedness level and cybersecurity response) and law enforcement (given to 
police and investigation agencies for capacity building in investigating and solving cybercrime 
cases). 
 
NASSCOM and DSCI have helped increase consumers’ cybersecurity awareness. In the early 
1990s, NASSCOM began a public-awareness campaign to educate software users and encourage 
lawful use. Other efforts include dissemination measures, such as CyberSafety Week, organized 
by the NASSCOM and government agencies in major cities. For instance, in 2010, NASSCOM, 
DSCI, and Mumbai police, with support from Ministry of Information Technology, organized 
CyberSafety Week—Mumbai to educate users on cyber safety and IT security. 
 
In recent years, NASSCOM has realized the need to focus on security issues associated with new 
technologies such as cloud computing and social media. NASSCOM–DSCI Information Security 
Summits address cloud security every year. In the 2011 DSCI Best Practices meeting, issues 
related to data protection and compliance in cloud computing were discussed. Likewise, a 
December 2012 DSCI seminar focused on preventing data theft and cyberattacks and securing 
critical infrastructure. 
 
Various State Roles and PPP Conditions 
 
It’s important to understand the enabling and constraining conditions that influence the success 
of PPP projects. Among the most important is the conduciveness of institutional environments to 
PPP. A government that’s friendly with the private sector, willing to involve players in key 
national economic policies, and interested to see this sector flourish is likely to be supportive of 
PPP initiatives. 
 
Broadly speaking, these conditions exist in India’s IT&BPM sector, which has facilitated 
cybersecurity-related PPP in the country. Major emphasis must be placed on enactment and 
enforcement of necessary laws. These conditions can be captured by the state’s regulatory, 
participatory, and supportive roles. The regulatory roles entail establishing and enforcing the rule 
of law. The participatory roles are about ensuring that businesses and citizens contribute to 
national policymaking. The supportive roles involve creating conditions that foster the growth of 
businesses in certain sectors. 
 
Regulatory Role 
 
In a regulatory state, a set of factors influences the enforcement of contracts: sound political 
institutions and the rule of law, a government free from corruption, bureaucratic quality, a strong 
and effective court system, and citizens’ willingness to accept the established institutions.(12) 
Again, the Indian government faces several challenges in performing regulatory state functions, 
which is its most glaring shortcoming. Indian states have faced budget problems and failed to 
comply with federal directives to hire judges and upgrade legal infrastructures and court 
facilities. 
 
Factors such as ineffective national legal systems, ambiguous laws on the books, a lack of 
resources, or a state’s unwillingness to allocate resources often severely hinder a state’s ability to 
control criminal activities. This is especially relevant for new types of crimes such as 
cybercrimes. India’s greatest barrier to cybersecurity is its unavailability and ineffectiveness of 
law enforcement owing primarily to its lack of resources and unwillingness to invest in such 
resources. 
 
A related problem is the low reporting rate of cybercrimes. Approximately 10 percent of 
cybercrimes are reported, and of those reported, about 2 percent are registered.(13) The 
conviction rate is estimated at 2 percent. The barriers, hurdles, and hassles that victims confront 
contribute to the low registration rates. Police often don’t support victims who want to file a 
cybercrime case and show unwillingness to investigate such crimes. For instance, a survey 
conducted by research firm BPO News indicated that although most Gurgaon business process 
outsourcing firms had been cybercrime victims, approximately 70 percent didn’t report to the 
police; many expressed doubt about competence, professionalism, and integrity of the police 
handling cybercrime cases.(14) Approximately 50 percent of these respondents believed cases 
aren’t dealt with professionally, and 30 percent noted that they had “no faith” in Gurgaon police. 
Cybercrime victims have also complained that the police’s process to build a case is long and 
inefficient. 
 
Thus, there is a vicious cycle: law enforcement agencies lack the skills, orientation, and 
capability to address cybercrime-related offenses; there are low cybercrime reporting rates 
because of victims’ lack of confidence in law enforcement agencies; and cybercriminals become 
more resourceful and powerful because their offenses aren’t reported and law enforcement 
agencies lack motivation or justification to improve their skills. 
 
Although NASSCOM and DSCI’s measures have been quite successful in boosting firms’ 
cybersecurity in the IT&BPM sector, many critical factors are beyond their control. The state’s 
weak regulatory role has negatively impacted key ingredients of cybersecurity. For instance, one 
estimate suggested that approximately 20 percent of resumes submitted for IT&BPM positions in 
India are fake.(15) The maximum punishment for faking a resume is termination of employment. 
Due to India’s highly inefficient legal system, fraudsters are rarely caught and punished. The rule 
of law is weakly developed and often ignored with impunity. Getting an outsourcing job on the 
basis of a fake resume is a high-reward, low-risk activity because such jobs pay better than those 
in other economic sectors.(15) 
 
Many of NASSCOM’s and DSCI’s responses are the result of a hollow state and institutions that 
are highly ineffective in dealing with India’s cybersecurity challenges. For instance, India lacks 
standard identifiers like the US Social Security number, making it difficult to check potential 
employees’ backgrounds. It costs up to $1,000 per employee to check backgrounds thoroughly. 
 
In 2005, in response to the lack of such databases, the NASSCOM announced a plan to launch a 
pilot employee-screening program called Fortress India, which would allow employers to screen 
out potential workers who have criminal records. This became the National Skill Registry 
(NSR), which allows employers to perform background checks on existing or prospective 
employees. It’s a voluntary registry for call center employees. Although the NSR doesn’t include 
the profiles of most potential job seekers, it’s a step in the right direction. 
 
Participatory Role 
 
A participatory state captures the extent to which policies and institutions represent the wishes of 
the members of society.(4) To protect their independence and autonomy, businesses might 
participate in national policymaking and work closely with state agencies. 
 
India’s PPP cybersecurity initiatives are largely a product of a participatory state. The country’s 
1991 economic liberalization was a major driving force behind the increased importance of 
groups such as trade associations; the state-dominated economic policy framework shifted to a 
decentralized one. Religious, social, economic, and political associations have offered a viable 
set of examples encouraging the development of many new trade and professional associations. 
A strong mutual interdependence between the state and the private sector—particularly 
organized business groups—has developed quickly. The liberalization thus resulted in more 
room for associations to flourish and have a strong voice as well as increased their participation 
in national policy development and planning processes.(16) 
 
The Indian government’s relationship with the private sector has involved a high level of trust 
and partnership in cybersecurity-related matters. In the early 2000s, the NASSCOM established a 
CyberCop Committee to provide cybersecurity services to the government and the private sector 
in an advisory capacity. In 2006, the NASSCOM drafted plans for new legal measures to 
safeguard intellectual property and prevent data theft. 
 
In recent years, the government has made efforts to create a favorable climate for a higher 
participatory involvement in cybersecurity. For instance, a cybersecurity joint working group 
(JWG) was established with representatives from government agencies and the private sector and 
mandated to come up with PPP recommendations in capacity building and policymaking for 
government consideration. The JWG released its “Engagement with Private Sector on Cyber 
Security” report in October 2012 (https://www.dsci.in/node/1211). NCSP incorporated many of 
the recommendations of this report as well as that of the NASSCOM–DSCI report “Securing Our 
Cyber Frontiers” (https://www.dsci.in/node/1092). Both reports placed high level of emphasis on 
the formulation of PPP to address cybersecurity issues—a key element of NCSP. 
 
Another sign of the improving climate for participatory involvement of the private sector 
occurred in October 2012, when India’s National Security Advisor announced a plan to establish 
a permanent working group on cybersecurity, with representatives from the government and the 
private sector, would implement the country’s cyberdefense framework. This marked the first 
time the Indian government allowed the private sector to participate in national security matters. 
 
Supportive Role 
 
A government can support cybersecurity development via legal and nonlegal influence. One way 
to do so is to address barriers related to skills, information, market, technology, and 
infrastructures. Nations that have achieved innovation-led growth also directly support these 
innovations. For instance, the US government invested heavily in several mission-oriented 
innovations, such as the microchip, the Internet, biotechnology, and nanotechnology. 
 
In general, the Indian government offers a low level of support to private businesses. The state’s 
supportive role is found to be less favorable to private businesses in India than in China. 
Nonetheless, the Indian government has shown a higher level of support and commitment to 
cybersecurity. For instance, the NASSCOM asked the government to create a special court to try 
people accused of cybercrimes. In response, the first cyber-regulation court was established in 
Delhi in 2009. 
 
Likewise, in view of the country’s lack of indigenous technology and patents in this area, the 
Indian government announced the possibility of providing financial assistance to Indian firms for 
acquiring foreign firms with high-end cybersecurity technology. The Ministry of External Affairs 
explored possible targets worldwide through Indian embassies and missions.(17) The Indian 
company that owns the technology gained through the acquisitions is required to give 
government agencies access to the intellectual property rights. 
 
 
Discussion and Implications 
 
Although sectoral business organizations such as trade associations are generally numerous and 
exist in almost every country, their level of development and influence on national policymaking 
and implementation vary greatly. NASSCOM is probably among the most influential and 
effective trade associations and has been successful in strategically solving collective 
cybersecurity problems of organizations in India’s IT&BPM sector. 
 
NASSCOM’s measures have paid off brilliantly. In regard to the Indian IT&BPM sector’s data 
security measures, a UK Banking Code Standards Board (BCSB) report noted: “Customer data is 
subject to the same level of security as in the UK. High risk and more complex processes are 
subject to higher levels of scrutiny than similar activities onshore” 
(http://www.rediff.com/money/2006/oct/07bpo.htm). 
 
Citing the findings of the BCSB and Forrester Research, NASSCOM’s then-president Karnik 
asserted that security standards in Indian call centers were among the best in the world, and there 
were more security breaches in the UK and the US in 2005 than in India.(18) DSCI’s principal 
consultant Rahul Jain attributed the Indian IT&BPM sector’s rapid growth to the adoption of best 
practices and global standards related to cybersecurity, investments in the latest cybersecurity 
technologies and processes, staff training, creation of high levels of employee awareness of 
cybersecurity, focus on IT governance, and internal cybersecurity auditing mechanisms.(19) 
 
Some have rightly labeled India’s cybersecurity policy as incomplete and “all words and no 
action” owing to the lack of a national cybersecurity action plan document or any guidelines 
regarding how the policy will be implemented.(20) Likewise, no clear action plan explains how 
NCSP’s various goals can be achieved. Nonetheless, if we look at the track record of the roles of 
the collaborations between public and private sectors, which have been mainly initiated by the 
NASSCOM, we have a wealth of detailed evidence about PPP’s role in strengthening 
cybersecurity. 
 
PPP has resulted in the enactment of regulations and rules related to cybersecurity. However, 
there are also major weaknesses and shortcomings in the enforcement of the existing laws. In this 
regard, NASSCOM’s efforts represent a limited but important part of India’s overall 
cybersecurity posture. 
 
Regarding the role of domestic spillover of cybersecurity-related knowledge and technology, it’s 
important to look at learning processes. Researchers have suggested that such processes 
generally take place through intra-IT&BPM and inter-industry externalities. The diffusion of 
information and expertise, interfirm labor mobility, and development of specialized services 
would facilitate such externalities. Research has also suggested that inter-industry spillover 
effects associated with export activities are positively related to industrial linkages. In this 
regard, to increase the effects associated with spillover and externalities, policy measures are 
needed to strengthen the linkages between the IT&BPM industry and other economic sectors. 
 
Especially when the state’s regulatory roles are weak, trade associations can fill the regulatory 
vacuum. Interfirm linkages, such as trade associations in emerging economies, can establish the 
industry’s moral legitimacy in Western economies. For instance, developed world–based 
offshoring clients might rely more on trade associations such as NASSCOM than on a weak, 
ineffective state. 
 
Trade associations can influence industry behaviors in several ways. These associations’ norms, 
informal rules, and codes of behavior can create order—without the law’s coercive power—by 
relying on a decentralized enforcement process in which noncompliance is penalized with social 
and economic sanctions.(21) In some situations, the state finds it beneficial to collaborate with 
such associations to rationalize an arena of activity. Associations can provide the state with 
expertise in developing new regulatory frameworks and strengthening enforcement. 
 
Although DSCI’s measures in strengthening data protection in the IT&BPM sector have been 
largely successful and can serve as a model for other developing economies, their effects aren’t 
noticed outside this sector. For instance, DSCI increases its members’ cybersecurity compliance 
by monitoring their security practices and providing training and education. Although DSCI’s 
codes of behavior are irrelevant outside the IT&BPM sector, training and educating law 
enforcement personnel is key to strengthening the national cybersecurity profile. One reason 
behind the extremely low conviction rate could be that DSCI’s training programs are insufficient 
to develop measurable competence in cybercrime investigation among law enforcement officers. 
A majority of its initiatives are special lectures or three- to five-day programs. More 
comprehensive training programs would allow trainees to master the cybercrime investigation 
techniques and feel confident about their ability to deal with cybercrimes. Although most current 
programs focus mainly on police officers, DSCI and the government need to educate 
prosecutors, judges, and lawyers using practical and layman’s language. 
 
PPPs are probably the most notable feature of the Indian cybersecurity landscape and an 
appropriate institutional means of dealing with underdeveloped cybersecurity-related institutions. 
Although the government has expressed a high degree of willingness to participate in PPP, 
resource constraints are a significant barrier to the legislation’s effective enforcement. And it’s 
fair to say that the government’s initiatives to enhance IT&BPM cybersecurity are more 
symbolic than substantive. 
 
In 2015, cybersecurity experts pointed out a number of challenges facing India’s cybersecurity 
initiatives, such as inadequate budget, lack of coordination of different states’ cybersecurity 
strategies, and lack of audits in software used in government agencies for security loopholes.(22) 
For instance, the Department of IT’s cybersecurity budget for the 2015 fiscal year was less than 
$20 million. In addition, attacks on Indian websites increased by about 500 percent between 
2010 and 2014. 
 
India’s digital economy has benefited greatly from NASSCOM’s and DSCI’s expertise in the 
interpretation, implementation, and application of data protection principles and their role as a 
repository of experience and source of cybersecurity best practices and cutting-edge knowledge. 
In this way, these agencies have been a driving force that has a major effect on India’s 
cybersecurity posture. In sum, whereas the government lacks resources, expertise, and legitimacy 
to develop new templates, monitor the behaviors of industries, and enforce laws, trade 
associations’ influences are likely to be more readily apparent. With well-focused priorities, 
trade associations will likely be better, more effective, and more efficient institutions to effect 
change in this area. 
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